The Representations and Realities of Female Kurdish Fighters

The idea of women engaging in frontline combat roles is one that sparks debate and controversy. Until 2013, women in Australia were not legally allowed to serve in combat roles. For armed rebel groups, however, such laws do not exist. Historically, Kurdish women have actively engaged in armed combat alongside men, and participated in political processes. Contemporary issues including the growth of ISIS, the Syrian civil war, and growing Turkish hostilities towards the Kurdish people has shed a spotlight on the female units of armed Kurdish groups. However, the Western media’s representation of Kurdish women has been skewed by attempts to objectify or glorify female fighters. This essay will explore the experiences of the Kurdish people and of Kurdish women who engage in armed conflict in contrast to their portrayal in the media. Firstly, a brief introduction of the Kurdish people and their history will be provided to contextualise the roles and purposes of armed Kurdish groups. Secondly, the experiences of the Kurdish people as a marginalised group will be discussed. Finally, three selected articles will be analysed to highlight the disparities between the experiences of female fighters, and their portrayal in the media. The selected articles are by no means an extensive sample size and do not represent the views of all media outlets. They have been selected due to their popularity and will be used to exemplify a generalised stance by mainstream media.

The Kurdish peoples originally formed an indigenous ethnic majority throughout the central-eastern cities of the Ottoman Empire. The Kurdish nationalist movement for a formalised Kurdish state can be traced to 1923, with the Treaty of Sevres. As the Ottoman Empire was dissolved, Kurds became a minority within the region, separated by newly instated national borders. Historically, attempts to gain political recognition by nationalist groups have been violently suppressed because state governments, particularly in Turkey, prioritised the creation of a collective state identity, over appeasing ethnic minorities. Currently, an estimated 35 million Kurds reside in Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq. A constitutionally recognised Iraqi Kurdistan was established in 1991, and Rojava (or Syrian Kurdistan) gained de facto autonomy in 2012. The Kurdish nationalist movement in Iran has generally been less vocal than in surrounding states, because Iranian Kurds generally follow the Shite tenants of Islam, in contrast to most Kurds outside of Iran who follow the Sunni tenants. Since the 1990s, there been a resurgence of the nationalist movement due to cross border cooperation between nationalist groups. In Turkey, the issue of Kurdish nationalism continues to be both politically suppressed and vilified by mainstream media outlets.

Traditionally, armed Kurdish groups (which women were a part of) have been formed to defend Kurdish-majority areas against oppressive governments in Syria, Turkey, and Iraq. The YPG are the People’s Protection Unit that were formed during the Syrian civil war, and act as a de facto military in Rojava. The Unit is considered the most effective in the region against ISIS and has received support in the form of weaponry from the United States. The YPJ form the women’s wing of the YPG, but have separate commanders. Similar to the YPG, the Peshmerga are the military forces of autonomous Iraq. The female wing of the Peshmerga are the Zeravani unit. The Iranian Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) have been classified as a terrorist group by the Iranian and Turkish governments. The female wing of the PJAK is called the HPJ or the Women’s Defence Force. In Turkey, the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) have also been classified a terrorist organisation, despite originating as a political party. The PKK has an armed wing that has been accused of committing acts of domestic violence. Notably, Turkish authorities view the Syrian-Kurdish YPG and the Iranian-Kurdish PJAK as an extension of the PKK. The PKK is the largest of all the Kurdish groups, and has smaller wings in Kurdish majority areas outside of Turkey.

Since 2014, both the YPG and armed factions of the PKK have grown in membership to fight the rise of ISIS across Syria and Iraq. In August 2014, ISIS began to attack Iraqi Kurdistan where the largest concentration of Yazidi Kurds reside. Yazidi Kurds form a religious minority within the Kurdish people, and do not follow the classic tenants of Sunni Islam. Yazidi women faced high levels of gender-based and sexual violence from ISIS, including being sold as slaves. As a result, membership for armed groups has included both young men and women. Women account for almost 40% of YPG members. Some of the reasoning behind joining armed groups for men and women overlaps; they all want to defend autonomous Kurdish regions in Iraq and Syria against ISIS, or join after being persuaded by friends. But motives exclusive to women also exist. Some women joined armed groups during their early adolescent years in an effort to avoid marriage, others hoped to escape the limited opportunities available to Kurdish minorities in their hometowns. According to research supported by the Journal of Global Security Studies, women favour rebel groups that advocate for greater economic stability and political security, and groups that focus on ethnic or religious grievances. By joining armed groups, women have the opportunity to actively shape political discourse, gain a sense of independence and learn to defend themselves. The all-female units allow women to take part in frontline combat and act as security for vulnerable communities. YPJ spokesperson, Nesrin Abdullah, has argued that the YPJ is a moral and cultural group, as it works to empower young Kurdish women within the contexts of the Kurdish community. She went on to explain, “the women of the YPJ, aim for not only liberation from ISIS but also a liberation of mentality and thoughts” (McKernan, 2017, para, 4). The strong presence of women in armed groups can be attributed to the long history of resistance Kurdish people have faced. Throughout the Saddam regime, when persecution of Iraqi Kurds increased, Kurdish women fought alongside men in mixed units. During the siege of Kobane in Syria from September 2014 to March 2015, the Kurdish community mobilised against ISIS fighters. Once again, both men and women were required to engage in armed combat in order to resist oppressive forces.

Although Kurdish men and women fight alongside each other in conflict zones, their experiences differ considerably. As institutions, militaries, militias, and armed rebel groups, have been traditionally male-dominated. The high rates at which sexual and gender-based abuse and discrimination occur within male-dominated organisations, particularly militaries, is deeply concerning. Women in military organisations are more likely to experience assault, than women working in non-military organisations. Furthermore, female veterans are four times more likely to face domestic violence and end up homeless. This is often due to veterans suffering from severe physical or mental health related issues, such as post traumatic stress disorder, or being unable to reintegrate into civilian life. More obvious risks of engaging in armed combat would be the likelihood of physical harm, fatalities, and separation from family.

On the 17th of September, 2016, The Sun newspaper reported the death of a 22-year-old YPJ member, Asia Ramadan Antar, in an ISIS attack in Syria. The article was headlined ‘Poster Girl Killed Fighting: Beautiful female fighter dubbed the Angelina Jolie of Kurdistan dies while battling ISIS in Syria’, and continued to focus solely on her appearance and likeliness to Angelina Jolie for the first half of the article. Similarly, an ABC News article reporting on the YPJ began the story by describing the physical appearance of YPJ members. News anchor, Juju Chang, continuously emphasises the word “female” throughout the report, focusing on the gender of the fighters and detracting from the conflict. The observation that these women wear lipstick and “let their long, braided hair fall out behind their hats” (McLaughlin, 2016, para. 1) was found to be of greater significance than the fact that they are “the most effective indigenous force against ISIS in the region” (McLaughlin, 2016, para. 7). An article written for the Daily Mail focused exclusively on the makeup routines of the Peshmerga Iraqi-Kurdish fighters. Infantry solider, Ahd Mohemed, was pictured with a list of the beauty products she uses on a daily basis before she begins her training. Susan Mohammed Rashid, a new Peshmerga recruit, was pictured in full uniform, posing on a couch. Through the analysis of these articles, three observations have been selected for further discussion.

Firstly, all three articles mentioned that the physical attributes of the women do not detract from the fact that they are fighting to defend their land. However, by first introducing female fighters as beautiful and traditionally feminine, a tone of frivolousness is already established. The forced glamorisation of these fighters concludes that even in situations of extreme violence, and death, women are identified as women first and as people second. It is evident, based on the language of the articles, that the role of these women as frontline fighters is trivialised. The media’s objectification and sexualisation of women is a topic that has been heavily researched and commented upon. Media and terrorism scholar, Bridgette Nacros, concluded that when women begin to emerge in traditionally male-dominated spheres (such as participating in armed conflict), the media has an important role to play in framing the narrative (2005). What media outlets generally tend to do is convey the narrative using familiar frames, for example, continuing to portray women through a classical feminine or maternal lens (Nacros, 2005). Even in cases where media articles have tried to employ empowering language to describe Kurdish women, the narrative has still been grounded in gender. A feature article for the Foreign Policy magazine titled ‘Meet the Badass Women Fighting the Islamic State’, dedicated an entire paragraph to describe the wrinkles and “piercing grey eyes” of a PKK sniper (Salih, 2014, para. 2). The shift in language to depict these women as “bad asses” is still clearly gendered (Salih, 2014). The PKK have been categorised as a terrorist organisation by the United States, and for an American publication to praise the female members of the PKK as bad ass rebels, demonstrates how confused the media is by female fighters.

The selected articles worked to contribute to the problematic and orientalist Western gaze over non-white women. The article for the ABC was accompanied with a video of reporter Elizabeth McLaughlin entering a Peshmerga camp, as she announced her access into the everyday lives of Kurdish female fighters. This intrusive fascination with the lives of non-Western women can be further explained through the works of Iranian sociologist, Roksana Bahramitash. She argues that post 9/11, the West’s interest in the “plight” and “oppression” of Middle Eastern women has increased substantially (Bahramitash, 2005, p. 221). As a result, any literature or contemporary issue that provides an insight into the activities of Middle Eastern women become sources of extreme interest. Kurdish women have formed an active role in resistance movements since the time of the Ottoman Empire. Yet, these women began to receive widespread media coverage in the West since the rise of ISIS in 2014. The notion of Middle Eastern women participating in armed combat alongside men, holds shock value for Western audiences. Instead of investigations into the implications of women needing to take up arms against an organisation that rapes and sells Kurdish women as sex slaves, fighters such as Asia Ramadan Antar have been reduced to their exotic appearance by the Western media. In an interview with BBC News, YPJ commander, Agrin Senna, argued that comparing Antar to Angelina Jolie diminished her combat expertise. Antar had taken part in five separate missions across Syria, before she was shot by ISIS members near the Turkish border. By likening her to a Hollywood actress, The Sun demonstrated that it is completely removed from the realities of Kurdish fighters, and created its own Eurocentric narrative about Kurdish women.

After analysing the selected articles, a broad conclusion can be drawn that the media reports on women with a lack of nuance and complexity. This lack of understanding is only heightened when the question of non-Western women is raised. Members of the public assume that journalists and news media outlets report on contemporary issues objectively and responsibly. The Sun and Daily Mail outlets may be classified as tabloids, once they begin to report on current affairs, the responsibility to report with integrity returns. Kurdish women who engage in armed combat, are required to do so out of a need to protect their marginalised communities. Historically, Kurdish men and women have engaged in armed combat and political mobilisation in order to secure autonomous areas for their persecuted communities. Kurdish women are not fighting in frontline positions to be praised in the news for their appearance, they need to fight because the alternative could be slavery or death. The Western media’s perception of Kurdish women as exotic warriors or ‘bad asses’ feeds into a formulaic and pre-existing view of women who take up arms. By contrasting reports of YPG fighters (who are deemed to be violent terrorists) against the YPJ units (who are referred to as beautiful, empowered women) the politicisation of gender becomes clear. This analysis has been limited to three selected articles, but further research would show that the treatment of Kurdish women by Western media is pervasively problematic. At the most basic level, a stance of impartiality and objectiveness should be adopted when reporting on conflict situations. Additionally, the use of gender-sensitive and culturally-sensitive language would ensure that Kurdish women are not being further ostracised.

Can Turkey Continue as an Emerging Power Despite Issues of Instability?

The economic future of Turkey and its potential to emerge as a leading economy is both unpredictable and fascinating. As one of the few secular, democratic states in the Middle East, Turkey has acted as a strong stabilising force in the region. Its rich history and culture, and thriving tourism industry have contributed to maintaining its influence and soft power in both developing and developed countries. Turkey has also played an active role in multilateral institutions, and chaired the 2015 cycle of the Business 20 (part of G20). However, the country has recently suffered from increasing political instability and a lack of sustainable economic policies which have led to a decline in growth and development. This paper will argue that Turkey has a strong potential to emerge as an leading economy despite its current political instability.

Since its formation as the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the economic strategies pursued by the state were aimed to develop its local industries and which were initially government-owned and funded. By the 1980s, under the leadership of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) Turkey began to liberalise its economy. However, the emergence of the Kurdish Independence Movement, and Turkish Central Bank crisis of 2000, halted the economic development of the country. As a result, the economy did not reflect positive growth until 2002. From 2002 to 2013, Turkey enjoyed a steady GDP growth rate of 4% each year. In 2013, Turkey was identified as one of the emerging MINT economies in response to the steady GDP growth and increasing FDI flow. Its FDI flow grew from USD9.1 billion in 2010 to USD12.9 billion in 2013.

Turkey’s adjacency to Europe, Asia, and the Middle East allows for maximum market access. With oil and fuels prices on the rise, a geographic proximity to markets of over 1 billion customers, gives Turkey a major competitive advantage. In addition, Turkey has formed many free trade agreements in the region, most significantly the EU’s Customs Union agreement. Therefore, even if Turkey operates outside of EU borders, it can still trade freely within its markets. Furthermore, there have been plans by the Turkish Chamber of Shipping to establish ports in the Aegean, Mediterranean, and Black Seas. While the construction of the Candarli Port in the Aegean Sea will cost the state USD 980 million, it is set to create employment opportunities and facilitate trade growth.

It should be noted that throughout these periods of economic growth, social and political instability has remained present. The attempted military coup by the Peace at Home Council in July 2016, and ongoing Syrian refugee crisis has taken its toll on the economy. In 2016, a survey of Reuters economists concluded that economic growth would increase by 3.5% in 2016-2017, this estimate fell below the government’s prediction of a 5% growth. Yet, FDI flows to Turkey remain steady and the tourism industry is growing steadily.

In conclusion, Turkey has established economic systems and institutions since the 1980s. This has created a foundation for steady economic growth despite momentary social and political struggles. Established economic policies coupled with its geographical advantage outweighs Turkey’s internal issues and will likely result in continued steady growth albeit with periods of slower growth.